World War Wednesdays: In the News: The USS Indianapolis

USS Indianapolis in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii in 1937. US Navy Photo

     Among the many hot topics to hit the airwaves in the past few weeks was the discovery of the WWII USS Indianapolis wreck at its final resting place in the Philippine Sea. In the spirit of this remarkably tragic piece of American history, I've elected to discuss the life and legacy of its captain, Charles McVay III, in the hopes of a renewed discussion of the story's human element.

U.S. Naval Institute

      Capt. Charles McVay III was a 1920 graduate of the US Naval Academy and a career naval officer with an exemplary record, whose father had commanded the Navy's Asiatic Fleet in the early 1900s. Before taking command of the Indianapolis in November 1944, he was chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee of the combined chiefs of staff in Washington, the Allies' highest intelligence unit. According to ussindianapolis.org, "Captain McVay led the ship through the invasion of Iwo Jima, then the bombardment of Okinawa in the spring of 1945 during which Indianapolis anti-aircraft guns shot down seven enemy planes before the ship was struck by kamikaze on March 31, inflicting heavy casualties, including 13 dead, and penetrating the ship's hull. McVay returned the ship safely to Mare Island in California for repairs.

     On July 16, 1945, the Indianapolis sailed from California with a top secret cargo to Hawaii for refuelling, then to Tinian where it unloaded its cargo, the uranium and major components of the atomic bomb to be dropped on Hiroshima by the Enola Gay on August 6. The Indianapolis was then routed to Guam that the seeds for the destruction of the Pacific had long since ceased. The Japanese surface fleet no longer existed as a threat, and 1,000 miles to the north preparations were underway for the invasion of the Japanese mainland. These conditions resulted in a relaxed state of alert on the part of those who were to route the Indianapolis across the Philippine Sea."

     ussindianapolis.org includes a list of evidence as to the details of the ship's fateful final journey:

• Although naval authorities at Guam knew that on July 24, four days before the Indianapolis departed for Leyte, the destroyer escort USS Underhill had been sunk by a Japanese submarine within range of his path, McVay was not told.
• Although a code-breaking system called ULTRA had alerted naval intelligence that a Japanese submarine (the I-58 by name which ultimately sank the Indianapolis) was operating in his path, McVay was not told. (Classified as top secret until the early 1990s, this intelligence -- and the fact it was withheld from McVay before he sailed from Guam -- was not disclosed during his subsequent court-martial.)
• Although no capital ship (unequipped with antisubmarine detection devices such as the Indianapolis) had made the transit between Guam and the Philippines without a destroyer escort throughout World War II, McVay's request for such an escort was denied.
• Although the routing officer at Guam was aware of dangers in the ship's path, he said a destroyer escort for the Indianapolis was "not necessary" (and, unbelievably, testified at McVay's subsequent court-martial that the risk of submarine attack along the Indianapolis's route "was very slight").
• Although McVay was told of "submarine sightings" along his path, none had been confirmed. Such sightings were commonplace throughout the war and were generally ignored by navy commanders unless confirmed.

    "Thus, the Indianapolis set sail for Leyte on July 26, 1945, sent into harm's way with its captain unaware of dangers which shore-based naval personnel knew were in his path. Captain McVay's orders were to "zigzag at his discretion." Zigzagging is a naval maneuver used to avoid torpedo attack, generally considered most effective once the torpedoes have been launched. No Navy directives in force at that time or since recommended, much less ordered, zigzagging at night in poor visibility. At about 11pm on Sunday night, July 29, the Indianapolis traveling alone was about halfway across the Philippine Sea. There was heavy cloud cover with visibility severely limited. Captain McVay gave orders to cease zigzagging and retired to his cabin. Minutes later the ship was  spotted as an indistinct blur by Japanese submarine commander Mochitura Hasimoto of the I-58. It was coming directly toward him from the east. Shortly after midnight the ship was struck by two torpedoes and sank in about twelve minutes. 

     When the ship failed to arrive at Leyte on Tuesday morning, a series of blunders ensued. First, there was confusion as to which area the Indianapolis was to report when it arrived. Second, there was no directive to report the non-arrival of a combatant ship. And, third, there was no request to retransmit a garbled message which would have clarified the Indianapolis' arrival time. As a result, the surviving crew of the Indianapolis was left floating in shark-infested waters until 11am on Thursday, August 2, when Lt. Wilbur C. Gwinn, the pilot of a Ventura scout-bomber, lost the weight from his navigational antenna trailing behind the plane, a loss which was to save the lives of 316 men. While crawling back through the fuselage of his plane to repair the thrashing antenna, Gwinn happened to glance down at the sea and noticed a long oil slick. Back in the cockpit, Gwinn dropped down to investigate, spotted men floating in the sea, and radioed for help. At 3:30 that afternoon Lt. R. Adrian Marks, flying a PBY Catalina, was the first to arrive on the scene. Horrified at the sight of sharks attacking men below him, Marks landed his flying boat in the sea, and, pulling a survivor aboard, he was the first to learn of the Indianapolis disaster." ussindianapolis.org

     Capt. William J. Toti, USN (Retired) describes the legal scandal that ensued:         "The Indy controversy erupted in August 1945, just after the atomic bombs were dropped. The American public was outraged at the loss of more than 800 lives in the waning days of the war, and a Navy court of inquiry was convened to investigate. Its recommendation was that Captain McVay be court-martialed for hazarding his vessel by failure to zigzag, but Admiral Chester Nimitz disagreed and instead issued the captain a letter of reprimand. Admiral Ernest King later overturned Nimitz’s decision and recommended a court-martial, which Secretary of the Navy Forrestal later convened.

In doing so, King intervened directly with the Secretary of the Navy to move forward with the court-martial in parallel with an investigation by the Inspector General (IG). But a court-martial is a trial, not an investigatory tool. If King’s problem was simply a lack of information, why didn’t he allow the Inspector General to issue his report before ordering the court-martial? Some believe it is because King was not satisfied that the IG’s conclusions would support his decision to court-martial.

The Navy Judge Advocate General also was asked to review the referral. His response contained the curious statement that the charges included in the initial referral were “the only ones that can be supported,” as if an agenda was at work to establish a greater foundation for prosecution. Whatever the truth, this statement certainly creates the perception that the Judge Advocate General was under direction to discover more charges to refer against McVay.

     

     In the end, McVay was charged with two counts: suffering his vessel to be hazarded by failing to zigzag, and failure to order abandon ship in a timely manner. His counsel, reportedly hand-picked by King, had never argued a case in court before. The court claimed that McVay was not being charged for any deficiency that led to the sinking of his ship. They made a strong case that the “Indianapolis was hazarded before she was ever detected by I-58, and would have been hazarded if she had never been detected by I-58.” In essence, McVay could have been found guilty in a court– martial even if his ship had not been sunk. This is a meaningless legal distinction, however, since absent the sinking, there would have been no way for anyone to know that the vessel had been hazarded.

     Hence, despite the fact that McVay was convicted only on the first count—for suffering his vessel to be hazarded by not zigzagging—there is no way to escape the fact that Captain McVay was court-martialed for having his ship sunk. Put all these facts together, and it is understandable why most of the survivors believe that Admiral King was doing all he could to tilt the scales of justice against McVay. Even Admiral Nimitz later would say to one survivor that the entire affair involving the court-martial was a mistake and should never have happened."

     From a statement submitted at a September 1999 Senate hearing by Paul J. Murphy, USS Indianapolis survivor: "The charge upon which he was convicted for failing to zigzag contained a phrase 'in good visibility.' The visibility that night was NOT good as all of us know who were there that night."

     Like Murphy, many of Indianapolis's survivors said that McVay was not to blame for the sinking, the families of some of the men who died thought otherwise. One piece of mail read: "Merry Christmas! Our family's holiday would be a lot merrier if you hadn't killed my son." The guilt that was placed on McVay's shoulders mounted until he committed suicide in 1968, using his Navy-issued revolver. He was discovered on his front lawn with a toy sailor in one hand. He was 70 years old.

     In 1996, sixth-grade student Hunter Scott began his research on the sinking of the Indianapolis, which led to a United States Congressional investigation. In October 2000, the United States Congress passed a resolution that Captain McVay's record should state that "he is exonerated for the loss of Indianapolis", which was signed by President Bill Clinton. The resolution noted that, although several ships of the U.S. Navy were lost in combat in World War II, McVay was the only captain to be court-martialed for the sinking of this ship.

     In July 2001, the United States Secretary of the Navy ordered McVay's official Navy record cleared of all wrongdoing.

     In July 2016, new details about the sinking emerged which helped lead to the wreck's discovery this month. Read about those details here: http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/29/us/uss-indianapolis-sinking-anniversary/index.html and the discovery here: http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-41041013

     Credits to ussindianapolis.org and the U.S. Naval Institute for the information in this post. 

     Thanks for reading,

Delany (@DLeitchHistory on Twitter)

World War Wednesdays: "In-Flu-Enza": The Spanish Flu Epidemic, 1918-19

     I had a little bird,

its name was Enza.

I opened the window,

and in-flu-enza

-Children's skipping rhyme, 1918

     Some fascinating and tragic elements of the First World War are the devastating events that occurred on the home front during that period. After four long years of unprecedented global devastation, the war ended in 1918 with a raging influenza epidemic which was partly spread by soldiers returning home. Ultimately, at least 20 million people around the world succumbed to the disease, including an estimated 50,000 Canadians. 

     Uniquely lethal in its tendency to attack young, healthy bodies, the Spanish Flu was spread through bodily fluids and moved quickly through the population. It manifested itself through fatigue and cough but quickly escalated its attack, creating mucous build-up in the lungs that was impossible to expel. Victims of the disease could be dead within days of contracting the illness.

     The Flu came in three waves: the first in the spring of 1918, the second (and most lethal) in late August, and the third and final during the winter of 1918-1919. Contrary to its name, it did not originate in Spain at all. Wartime censorship meant that combatant armies did not release any information about the flu in an attempt to maintain civilian morale. Since Spain was a neutral party during the war, it had no reason to impose censorship, leaving Spanish newspapers free to report on infected citizens. As a result, Spain was tagged as being the origins of the virus. 

"The 1918 has gone: a year momentous as the termination of the most cruel war in the annals of the human race; a year which marked, the end at least for a time, of man's destruction of man; unfortunately a year in which developed a most fatal infectious disease causing the death of hundreds of thousands of human beings. Medical science for four and one-half years devoted itself to putting men on the firing line and keeping them there. Now it must turn with its whole might to combating the greatest enemy of all--infectious disease," (12/28/1918).

     Canada's flu dead included soldiers who had survived the fighting in Europe only to succumb to the disease upon their return to Canada. In addition, thousands of family members who welcomed them home also perished soon after their arrival. This horrible reality hit close to home in Dunwich Township with the death of returned soldier Harry Bateman Blue of Iona Station in January 1919, He is the only confirmed local soldier who succumbed to the virus according to my database and research this past spring. 

     In addition to the widespread fatalities, the epidemic caused severe social and economic disruption. Children were orphaned, many families found themselves without their chief wage earner, and armies on both sides of the war were temporarily debilitated. Businesses lost profits from both a  lack of demand for their products and a reduced workforce. In an attempt to halt the spread of the disease, municipal governments closed all services except those necessary, and provinces enacted laws regarding quarantine and enforced the wearing of masks in public. Although the Canadian population happily accepted these restrictions, it opposed the federal government's request that victory celebrations be postponed until December 1. 

     Although decreasingly virulent, the Spanish Influenza strain remained active in Canada until the mid-1920s. While crippling in the majority of its immediate effects, the epidemic is credited with leading to the establishment of the federal Department of Health in 1919. In addition, since pneumonia contracted by a patient who was weakened by influenza became a major cause of death, the discovery of penicillin greatly weakened the impact. 

Timeline of the Spread of Flu and Movement of Soldiers:

The Limits of Necessity: Public Health, Dissent, and the War Effort during the 1918 Influenza Pandemic notes the spread of the virus was connected to the movements of soldiers. This piece provides some great insight on the social climate at the time and the ways in which military efforts defined Canadian life. Some interesting quotes and notes follow.

• “[Carol Byerly] suggests that military physicians and government officials were caught between their obligation to protect the public health and their duty to prosecute the war effort. According to her analysis, health and war became competing interests.” 
• The first wave of flu broke out in ranks of Canadian Expeditionary Force in France and Belgium in May 1918,  and sickened Canadian soldiers stationed in England a month later 
• Infected soldiers sailed for Canada on June 26 on the Araguaya, the last Canadian vessel to ferry wounded soldiers back across the Atlantic until the end of September 
• Arrived at Halifax harbour on July 7, 23% of its soldier-passengers were infected.
• ”The second and more deadly wave of the flu first appeared among American soldiers at Camp Devens outside of  Boston on 8 Sept. 1918. By the month’s second week, it had already spread across Massachusetts and into New York State.” 
• 17 September→ broke out among Polish American recruits at a camp outside of Niagara-on-the-Lake
• 20 September→ soldiers began reporting sick at St. Jean Military Hospital.
• “In the midst of this crisis, MacPhail requested her father’s permission to sign on for active VAD service. Now a certified VAD nursing assistant, she argued that the city was “crying out for helpers and being young and strong I feel I ought to” despite the fact that the flu showed "no respect for youth.” 
• “In this era," Nancy Bristow argues, "there was a presumption that women, whatever their nursing qualifications, would put themselves in harm’s way to fulfill their natural caring role. Certainly, many women came forward to nurse influenza victims, despite the risk to themselves.” 

     Many thanks to the Canadian War Museum, The Canadian Encyclopedia, and the University of Waterloo's Department of Drama page, "Contagion, Pandemics, and Humanity" for the information and images used in this post. 

     Thanks for reading,

Delany (@DLeitchHistory on Twitter)